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Abstract 
 
Complexity science has proliferated across academic domains in recent years. 
A question arises as to whether any useful sense of ‘generalized complexity’ can 
be abstracted from the various versions of complexity to be found in the 
literature, and whether it could prove fruitful in a scientific sense. Most 
attempts at defining complexity center around two kinds of notions: 
Structural, and temporal or dynamic. Neither of these is able to provide a 
foundation for the intuitive or generalized notion when taken separately; 
structure is often a derivative notion, dependent on prior notions of complexity, 
and dynamic notions such as entropy are often indefinable. The philosophical 
notion of process may throw light on the tensions and contradictions within 
complexity. Robustness, for instance, a key quality of complexity, is quite 
naturally understood within a process-theoretical framework. Understanding 
complexity as process also helps one align complexity science with holistically 
oriented predecessors such as General System Theory, while allowing for the 
reductionist perspective of complexity. These results, however, have the further 
implication that it may be futile to search for general laws of complexity, or to 
hope that investigations of complex objects in one domain may throw light on 
complexity in unrelated domains.  
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Some will still feel the need to account for the impression that something 
has increased in the history of the Metazoa … but if we take a skeptical approach, it seems 
reasonable to ask at this point - having investigated four kinds of complexity - 
whether complexity has anything to do with the apparent trend … the possibility should be 
considered that the appearance of a trend of any sort is an illusion, a trick of the imagination …. 
thus, at least at present, given the state of our knowledge, we would seem to have little basis for 
concluding that the "something" is complexity. 
 
— D. McShea, Complexity in Evolution: A Skeptical Assessment 
 
 
The central character of scientific revolutions is that they alter the knowledge of nature that is 
intrinsic to the language itself and that is thus prior to anything quite describable as description or 
generalization, scientific or everyday. 
 
 — T. Kuhn, What are scientific revolutions?    
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have seen an enormous proliferation of studies concerning 
complexity and complex systems. The study of complexity and complex phenomena 
extends from computation, to biology, physics, sociology, economics and even 
management studies. What, if anything, ties all these diverse areas together? Is there a 
useful sense of complexity that can be extracted from various disciplinary senses? Is 
complexity science, or rather, the interdisciplinary behemoth that might be called 
‘generalized complexity science’ (whose institutional incarnation is the well-known 
Santa Fe Institute), scientifically fruitful, or is it rather beset by a fundamental uncertainty 
that would belie any such attempts?  
In a comparatively early attempt at formulating a characterization of the ‘diverse 
kinds of complex systems’ Simon (1962) concluded that such an attempt might not be in 
vain, and that hierarchy could in fact be the basic key to generalized complexity. As well, 
he conjectured that descriptions of complex objects are best handled by a mixture of state 
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and process descriptions (i.e. descriptions of actions such as those involved in 
constructing a geometrical object, or in describing metabolism). As state descriptions are 
conventional in science, his requirement implies that we need to expand our repertoire of 
scientific terminology by adopting process descriptions in order to best account for the 
complexity we find in nature. Though tentative and self-confessedly explorative, Simon’s 
conclusions seem to be these: Both process and state descriptions are necessary for 
understanding complexity; process descriptions have been fundamental for the 
development of modern science, especially the sciences modeled by differential 
equations; and hierarchy is fundamental to complexity. Simon’s conclusions are 
stimulating and suggestive, and I believe that he is correct in his focus on process 
descriptions as an important factor in adequate accounts of complexity.  Nevertheless, I 
suggest his conclusions can be strengthened in the following way: 
 
a) Process is fundamental, not simply an alternative or supplementary 
source of description. The idea that process is fundamental is a key 
tenet of process philosophy, which subscribes to the notion that all state 
descriptions can be replaced by process descriptions, or, better put, that 
process descriptions capture something fundamental about reality that 
state descriptions do not.  
b) Contrary to Simon, differential equations have little to do with process; 
classical physics, which uses differential equations for its mathematical 
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models, is best understood from the ‘substantialist’, as opposed to 
processual viewpoint.1 
c) There is a possible relationship between process and hierarchy2. I offer 
the following sketch of an argument: A process, (conceived of in 
process-philosophical terms), is in fact best thought of as a hierarchy. A 
process possesses unity, temporal coherence, and formal patterning 
(Rescher, 2000, p. 24). Thus, the stages of a process (every process is 
made up of stages) cannot be entirely independent elements, due to the 
formal unity of the process: Processes are characterized by ‘interactive 
relatedness’ (Rescher, 1996, p.35). This, combined with the forward 
orientation of most processes (see p. 10 below), introduces an element 
of subordination that turns such stages into levels.  And reciprocally, the 
kinds of hierarchy dealt with in complexity usually have a temporal or 
at least interactive or variational element that renders them amenable to 
process analysis.  
 
Thus, I would like to put forward the suggestion that generalized complexity is in 
fact not an incoherent hodge-podge of notions, but is centered around the notion of 
process; however, not Simon’s descriptive notion of process, but the much more 
                                                
1 See e.g. Rescher (1996), pp. 95, 96 and Riche (2004) pp. 183–189. 
2 As Rescher (1996), p. 54, puts it, “Processes generally consist of processes … process theorists 
often use organismic analogies to indicate this idea of different levels of units: Smaller, 
subordinate (or subsidiary) processes unite to form larger, superordinate (or supersidiary) 
process-units …the idea of a hierarchic assemblage of micro- into macro-units is a pervasive and 
characteristic aspect of process philosophy”. 
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fundamental3 idea of process as an ontological category, the process, that is, of process 
philosophy, not process description. The reasons for placing process, (not simply process 
description, but process philosophy), at the center of complexity will become apparent in 
the course of my argument4. 
The question of the adequacy or validity of this characterization of generalized 
complexity is a separate issue, however. It is one thing to claim that process can unite the 
various intuitions or notions behind complexity. It is quite another to claim that such a 
unified notion can yield scientific results. As McShea (1991) writes (concerning the 
widespread intuition of a positive correlation between complexity and evolution), 
 
The gestalt of increasing complexity that emerges from an overview of the 
history of life is an unwavering one. We know, however, that gestalts, even 
steady ones, can mislead, and thus a study of its possible sources in perceptual 
or cultural biases seems worthwhile. (p.320) 
 
My conclusion that generalized complexity is best characterized as process is 
intended more as a diagnosis of the contemporary gestalt, than as a suggestion or 
recommendation for scientific methodology. Like McShea, I am skeptical of the 
fruitfulness of the notion of generalized complexity, and certainly do not propose that the 
                                                
3 Fundamental, because, unlike process description, process as an ontological or philosophical 
category is incompatible with state description. Process, as a fundamental category, also has very 
different identity criteria from substance, as will be discussed in section five. No such difference 
separates state and process descriptions (indeed, the process philosopher would likely claim that 
Simon’s distinction is really a distinction between state and action, not state and process.)   
4 Process is a much better understood and well-defined notion than many other concepts that are 
often put forth in similar attempts to get a philosophical grip on complexity, such as (but not 
limited to): Anti-reductionism, post-modernism, non-linearity, and anti-mechanism. Positive 
reasons for my claim will be offered in what follows. 
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concept of complexity, whether specific or general, be replaced by that of process. Yet I 
would like to avoid the suggestion that generalized complexity is an incoherent mess of 
intuitions — quite the contrary, there is a unity behind the diversity of directions in 
generalized complexity. At the same time, I doubt that such a unified concept can be 
scientifically fruitful, and for reasons that can be summed up in the following: McShea, 
in his assessment of these developments, employs the Kuhnian notion of gestalt to 
characterize the contemporary picture of complexity. The difference between process 
philosophy and what process philosophers call ‘substantialist’ philosophies is a difference 
similar to the difference between incommensurable Kuhnian paradigms. If generalized 
complexity is in fact part of a Kuhnian-type gestalt, a gestalt, moreover, grounded not 
simply in a particular picture or image of particular phenomenon (such as constrained or 
unconstrained motion, to mention a well-known example from Kuhn) but in a 
philosophical dichotomy, then the difficulties for complexity science in providing a 
coherent scientific picture of reality are profound5. 
 
2. Defining Complexity  
 
Let us make a fresh start. To begin with, there is the intractable problem of 
defining complexity. Biological complexity, on the one hand, is fairly well understood6. 
                                                
5 A fundamental assumption here is that such Kuhnian-like paradigms or gestalts are not only 
incommensurable, but of equal scientific value, and so cannot in themselves contribute to 
scientific knowledge. On this assumption (and the question of whether Kuhn would have held it is 
still an open one. See e.g. Worrall (2003)), the processual and substantialist viewpoints are 
equally ‘correct’, a point likely to be contested by both process and substantialist philosophers, 
among others. It is my suggestion that much of the frustration surrounding the attempts to 
characterize generalized complexity can be taken as evidence for the plausibility of this 
assumption, at least in the particular case of complexity. 
6 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 
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There appears to be something of a consensus that complexity in biology is best 
approached in terms of morphological complexity, that is, number and differentiation of 
parts and irregularity of their arrangement7. This kind of definition is evidently a 
structural definition, and it is clear that structure must play some part in any approach to 
complexity8. Venturing further afield, into other disciplines, there is much less clarity. 
Most attempts at explaining complexity to be found in the literature appear to be little 
more than an employment of metaphors that cycle through a range of equally ill-defined 
concepts, hardly else than semantic substitutions, shifting explanatory weight from 
complexity toward sibling notions such as non-linearity, hierarchy, multiplicity, and the 
like, all of which are barely defined any more adequately. As a start, however, it is to be 
noted that hierarchy, multiplicity, and non-linearity are clearly structural notions, as is 
morphological differentiation.  
On the other hand, we don’t have to look far to see that other classes of notions 
are often involved in defining complexity — in particular, generative, dynamic and 
regulatory notions, such as self-organization, emergence, adaptation, and feedback (and 
we will see later in the discussion that temporal metaphors may be in fact much closer to 
the heart of complexity than might be apparent initially).  But these latter terms are hardly 
clearer, and many cases are clearly to be understood in some sort of non-literal or non-
technical sense. In these latter senses, such concepts often do not function analytically.  
For example, how can feedback be distinguished from simple causal interaction? Is the 
presence of feedback in a system a sign of complexity, or does the interpretation of causal 
                                                
7 McShea (1991), p.2 
8 For motivations for this, and of the general reductionist approach of complexity, see part six 
below. 
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interaction as feedback not imply that complexity has already been read into the 
interpretation from the beginning? These questions can obviously be multiplied. 
The following discussion will have two parts. I will begin by exploring the limits 
of the intuitive concept of complexity, which I believe acts as a regulative concept for its 
scientific uses. This section will be primarily centered around a number of thought 
experiments designed to elucidate and pinpoint the core of the intuitive or everyday 
concept of generalized complexity. I hope to show that, via these thought experiments, 
that neither structural nor dynamical notions can fully explicate the concept of 
generalized complexity, and that in order to capture this notion we must turn to a 
different genus of concepts altogether. The second part of this paper will examine an 
example from the literature (centering on the ‘robustness’ of complexity), to determine 
whether the explanation I am proposing can adequately account for at least some of the 
principal properties of complexity. Finally, I will close with a few general observations 
concerning complexity’s alleged holistic or anti-reductionist characteristics.  
To begin with, let us look at some ‘classical’ explications of complexity. The 
editors of ‘Emergence’, an ‘International Trans-disciplinary Journal of Complex Social 
Systems’ in a preface entitled ‘What is Complexity Science?’ (Richardson & Cilliers, 
2001) offer the following.  
The most useful definition [of complexity] that we personally have 
found refers to the definition of a complex system […] 
which is simply given as a system that is comprised of a large 
number of entities that display a high level of nonlinear interactivity.  
 
 
This characterization is very close to that of Simon (1962). I think we can prescind from 
interactivity in the above and assume that the structural concepts (‘large number’, ‘non-
linear’) carry the weight of the definition. Interactivity may mean no more than inter-
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relation, in which case the definition could be extended to static systems such as crystals, 
snowflakes, or mathematical entities, which at least on some accounts are genuine 
candidates for complexity. At minimum, the inclusion of interactivity in this definition 
can be understood to imply that there must at least be some sort of ‘variation’ or change 
within a complex entity, over time, whether internal to the structure or not.9 So for now, I 
wish to put interactivity to one side; I will return to it and similar notions further into the 
discussion. We are left, then, with structural notions. Yet, are structural notions enough?  
 
3.	  Complexity,	  Structure,	  and	  Entropy.	  
	  
 Let us try to push the boundaries of the structural definition, by looking at the 
example of a junk heap, which according to this scheme is a complex, but not organized 
object10. A car is a complex object, in that it has many components, that interact in 
different ways, that are involved in different relationships with one another, and so on.  A 
junk heap (of broken cars, say) has a similar level of complexity in that the number and 
differentiation of parts is similar to that of a working car or collection of cars, but we 
hesitate to call such a junk heap organized, for such a heap does not appear to be put 
together in such a way that it can fulfill a function. A junk heap is disorganized, but 
complex. Were the junk heap to be an art installation, however, then we could impute a 
                                                
9 Thus, if one denies that either snowflakes or crystals are complex (e.g. Ladyman, Lambert & 
Wiesner (2013), one could still claim that their formation or generation in time may very well be 
complex. Goldenfeld & Kadanoff (1999) define complexity as ‘structure with variations’. The 
extent to which even static objects can be counted as complex varies in the literature. Cilliers 
(1998), p.14, says that ‘complex systems change with time’; Ladyman, Lambert & Wiesner 
(2013), p.14, claim that ‘Neither non-linear dynamics nor linear dynamics can be necessary 
conditions for complexity, since complexity scientists also study static structures’. Some of the 
proffered measures of complexity discussed in Lloyd (2001), such as difficulty of creation, would 
seem to be compatible with static entities.  
10 The example of the junk heap is from McShea (1991). 
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purpose to it, and it would cease to appear disorganized. But purely as a junk heap, it is a 
complex, but disorganized object.  
There is no doubt that a junk heap is disorganized, but can complexity really co-
exist with (a large measure of) disorganization? Is it best to think of a junk heap as 
complex? Is the morphological or structural account adequate in this case? 
In fact, a junk heap does not seem to be the kind of thing that is usually evoked by 
complexity theorists as an instance of complexity. It is certainly not a paradigmatic 
complex object, unlike, say, a thunderstorm, a galaxy, or a biological cell. If a working 
car is as, or nearly as complex as, a broken-down car, why is it that the kind of thing 
exemplified by the working car, the organized object, is more often cited as an example 
of complexity than the disordered object? Decay products, or residues, or non-living or 
non-functioning exemplars of living and functioning beings don’t seem to make the roster 
of complex objects as much as their organized counterparts do, despite being as complex 
(on the structural account).  
In an essay on process philosophy, Nicholas Rescher (1996, p. 101) states that 
process philosophers are optimistic and tend to identify processes with ‘forward’ looking 
processes, processes that tend toward progress and improvement or complexity in some 
way or another, rather than with processes that tend towards the opposite side of this 
spectrum11. I think a similar kind of ambivalence enters into the case of the junk heap. 
Structurally or morphologically, a junk heap is certainly complex, but when we examine 
the range of objects that are usually taken to exemplify complexity, it is in fact a certain 
kind of complex object that is always picked out from among the set of entities that are 
                                                
11 See note 16 infra. 
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structurally complex, and junk heaps are not usually part of that roster. Intuitively, junk 
heaps are not complex. 
Now one property that the complexity of a junk heap does not exemplify is 
emergence. The complexity of a junk heap does not seem to have emerged out of its 
components. It may indeed be a holistic property of the heap, in that it is a characteristic 
of the whole and not any one part, but it is not anything above the arrangements and 
orders of its parts, whereas the complexity of a functioning car does indeed seem to be 
more than this. Here is where prior states, and so temporality, may come in, for it appears 
that decay products in general (and a junk heap is a kind of decay product of a car or a 
bunch of cars) do not fit our intuitive notions of complexity because they represent the 
outcome of a process of entropic increase. That is, despite similar levels of organization 
or structure, decay products, since they are closer to states of equilibrium than products 
that are not the result of decay, are less complex than other products or entities that are 
not the result of breakdown or decay. On this account, complexity must be result of a 
process that emerges from a state of higher entropy. That is, a complex structure must be 
in a state of lower entropy (and so more ordered, in whatever sense of order is associated 
with far from equilibrium states) than its components. And a heap of car parts is 
definitely not more ordered, in this sense, than either a working car, or, say, a partially 
assembled but still not working car.  
Some, following Poli (2013) or Cilliers (1998), might want to make a distinction 
here between complexity and complication. Complicated objects, being mere aggregates 
of components, lack the integration and holistic nature that characterize true complexity. 
On this account one could claim that the apparent complexity of a disorganized object 
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such as a junk heap is in fact complication, not complexity, for it lacks the integration 
that truly complex — and by extension, organized — objects have. But is this distinction 
enough?  
There are two possible objections to the idea that the complex-complicated 
distinction is helpful in isolating the meaning of complexity. First, it is not always 
obvious that simple (non-complex) entities lack integration. If I am correct that objects at 
the high end of the entropy scale are never (intuitively) complex, than the conclusion 
follows immediately, for the disorder measured by entropy may very well be very 
different from the ‘dissipation’ or lack of integration found in merely complicated 
objects. Integration, the integration that Poli and Cilliers claim characterize complex 
objects, is surely a purely structural property of objects, not a statistical property as is 
entropy. Cilliers, for instance, mentions airplanes and computers as instances of 
complicated, but not complex objects. Yet surely both, considered in terms of the parts 
that compose them, are in far from equilibrium states. Second, it strikes me that 
integration, or the lack of the ability of individual part-by-part description to adequately 
characterize the whole, is a non-analytic property, similar in this way to ‘feedback’ 
mentioned above. Whether one is able to characterize an entity as integrated or not may 
well hinge on one’s decision to view the object as complex or complicated to begin with. 
Can a part by part description of a computer truly yield a full description of it, as Cilliers 
claims, while a comparative description of the brain cannot? Cilliers contends that the 
components of a complex system may shift and change, while those of a complicated 
system do not. But surely, considered functionally, the parts of a supposedly complicated 
system such as a computer do shift and change; components that store memory change 
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their values, data may be stored in read-only memory or in ‘virtual’ memory on the hard 
drive, files can be stored in consecutive bites or distributed across many locations, and 
furthermore these paths or maps of a file’s distribution in memory can themselves be 
stored for easier future access, perhaps rather similar to the way frequent activity in the 
brain is alleged to create new neural pathways. From the point of view of function, 
computer parts do indeed change. Likewise, jets can be upgraded, fitted with new 
equipment and software — computers and jets are in reality no more static than brains 
are. Thus, neither complexity nor complication is a transparent property; their application 
depends on a great deal of prior interpretation.  
The connection between thermodynamics and complexity is well-known, though 
not necessarily well-understood. It is easily seen that it is entropy that guides our sense of 
complexity in a great many instances12, not structural properties, like those in the 
complex/complicated distinction. We can see this by looking at another example, or 
rather a pair of examples, that involve mixing, distribution, and equilibrium. Compare a 
vial of oil and water, in equilibrium, with pebbles and grains of sand along a sloping 
shorefront. In the first example, the fully mixed combination of oil and water appears to 
be more complex than the vial with the oil and water separated. Oil is lighter than water 
and naturally rises to the top of the vial, but we would hardly call the fully differentiated 
example an example of a complex arrangement. Likewise, melted and refrozen ice cream, 
with the milk and water components now separated, is hardly more complex than the 
original mixture, which will begin to separate once placed in a environment with 
temperature above zero Celsius. But let us now turn to the seashore. If one looks closely, 
                                                
12 Being in a far from equilibrium state is, according to Cilliers (1998), p.15, a necessary 
condition of complexity.  
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one can see that the stones and sand, just under the point where the beach meets the 
water, are arranged according to size and weight, with the lighter and smaller particles 
further up the slope, towards the surface, and the heavier and larger pebbles further down, 
away from the beach. This beachside product of separation, the various pebbles and 
stones separated and arranged, according to size and weight, by the action of the waves, 
does appear to us to be more complex than unarranged sand.  Contrast this to the oil and 
water example, where the unarranged (that is, mixed) product appears to be more 
complex than the unarranged sample.  
Thus, structure or arrangement, by itself, is no guide to (general) complexity, for 
here we see that in different cases identical patterns may have opposite levels of 
complexity — in one case the homogenous mixture is the more complex, in the other 
case it is the heterogeneous mixture that has a higher level of complexity than the 
homogenous mixture. What we need to add, to end up with something that will let us 
decide whether a certain arrangement is complex or not, is the concept of entropy, that is, 
entropic order, (which may be different from purely surface or visual order). 
In fact, our notion of structure or order itself may be dependent on this 
understanding of complexity; in the oil and water example, it is easy to convince oneself 
that the homogenous mixture is more structured than the separated mixture, because the 
homogenous mixture is in a far from equilibrium state.  In the oil and water example, the 
mixed state is a state that is not in equilibrium; consequently, it is in a lower probability 
state, and so seems to an observer to be more ordered (and hence more complex) than the 
state of equilibrium where the oil and water form separate bands of liquid. If one were to 
encounter such a vial in its mixed state on a table in an empty room, for example, we 
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would tend to conclude that either the bottle either was not a closed, isolated system as 
we had supposed, or that we had by chance encountered the bottle in a statistically 
improbable state. Either the bottle had been shaken recently, when someone had come in 
to the room, picked up the vial, shaken it, placed it down, and left, or that the mixed up 
structure had recently emerged from an unmixed state, purely by chance. 
Contrast this situation with a vial of liquid in its separated state. It could have 
been sitting on the table in the empty room for an indefinite period; it has not emerged 
from anything, for there is no evidence that an hour ago, yesterday, the day before 
yesterday, or at any time before that the situation was any different from now. One might 
claim that emergence need not be understood in a temporal sense, and that the complexity 
that could in fact be seen in the structure of the oil and water when separated can be 
understood to have emerged out of the various elements of the situation at hand: the oil, 
the water, the vial, the presence of gravity, and so on. But surely the same could be said 
of the vial in its mixed up state. If we compare the two states, the order in the separated 
state, when we compare it with the mixed up state, now appears as too simple, too linear. 
The mixed up state has the correct measure of ‘chaos’ or non-linearity and un-
predictability that is needed to make it complex. In the pebble and sand example, the 
opposite occurs: the mixed, homogenous state is now at equilibrium, while the separated 
state is in a far from equilibrium situation, and so now appears to be more ordered and 
complex.  Here the mixed up state is purely chaotic, for there is nothing that contributes 
to its ordering.  
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4. Complexity Everywhere. 
 
There is no denying that the world we live in is complex … 
— Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Post-Modernism 
Complex systems are the usual, normal case. All living systems, all psychological 
systems, all social systems are complex. 
— Roberto Poli,  A Note on the Difference Between 
Complicated and Complex Social Systems 
 
Thus, it would appear that motivations or intuitions, in this case from statistical 
mechanics, which are external to an object’s morphology, are necessary in order to 
decide exactly where on the order-disorder continuum complexity lies. As we have seen, 
and as is often pointed out, complexity appears to lie partway between complete lack of 
order and the presence of too much order13. Complexity needs a measure of chaos or 
disorder to be truly complex. Yet structural considerations, taken apart from other 
notions, such as those brought in from statistical mechanics (entropy) or intentionality (in 
the case of functional notions such as organization) by themselves cannot tell us where 
along this continuum complexity is to be found. As a consequence, in areas where 
dynamical notions are not clearly applicable, where we cannot determine with any degree 
of certainty exactly what kind of order or structure is likely to constitute a state of 
equilibrium, or whether in fact states of equilibrium are even definable, there will be no 
                                                
13 For example: ‘… the one point of agreement in the complex systems community is that a 
measure of complexity should assign its highest value to systems which are neither completely 
random nor completely ordered.’ Ladyman, Lambert and Wiesner (2013). 
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clear guide as to where on the continuum complexity is to be placed, if it can even be 
placed at all, other than by making arbitrary assumptions.   
To illustrate with a brief example: Imagine the dynamics of groups of people 
inside and outside of some sort of gathering place, such as a shopping mall. The people 
belong to various ethnic groups (for sake of the example).  The people milling about 
outside we shall regard as somehow ‘free’ or unconstrained. As they enter the mall, they 
gradually disperse and become subject to various influences from within the mall, which 
we will regard as isolated from all other external influences. What we would like to 
determine is the influence of the various forces inside the mall on the population 
distribution according to ethnic group.  There are a number of possible scenarios.  In the 
first, people are initially distributed randomly outside; after a certain period of time in the 
mall, people have formed groups organized by ethnicity. People leave and join various 
groups in no determinate amount, so each individual group is not stable, some growing, 
some shrinking; however, each group nevertheless has a clear majority of one particular 
ethnicity at any time. 
The socio-economic dynamics within the mall have transformed an 
undifferentiated group of people into groups organized by ethnicity (perhaps various 
stores cater to various ethnic groups, but the precise causes don’t really matter at this 
point). We could say that a kind of complex pattern has emerged, a kind of grouping 
pattern, out of the less structured pattern outside. 
But now let us look at a pattern that is the exact inverse of the above. In this case, 
the distribution of people outside the mall is similar to the distribution of people inside 
the mall in the first example, while the distribution inside the mall in this second case 
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now resembles the initial configuration of the first. That is, ethnic grouping occurs in the 
initial state, but yields to a roughly random distribution once the forces inside the mall 
have had their effect. In this case, the mall dynamics have changed an ordered situation to 
a near random one. Still, it is possible to view this near random distribution as a complex 
one. One could say that the mall dynamics have broken up the ethnic-affiliated groupings 
found outside the mall into groupings with near equal distribution of ethnicities in a way 
roughly similar to the way the oil and water are distributed in the vial after being shaken 
up; after the infusion of market forces, a complex mixing pattern has disturbed the resting 
pattern of ethnic affiliations and has replaced it with a more integrated and so more 
complex pattern of affiliations, more complex than simple ethnic affiliation.  
How can both patterns be complex? How can one particular pattern be complex in 
one situation, but simple in a different situation14? 
One answer may be the following: complexity follows on intuitions from a variety 
of areas, such as thermodynamics, dynamical systems theory (chaos theory) or living 
processes, in addition of course to the structural notions mentioned above15.  In certain 
circumstances, such as in the first two models discussed, our understanding of what 
makes an object complex depends on intuitions culled from our knowledge of the 
dynamics of the entities respective environments (the seashore in one case, a closed vial 
in the other). In other situations (especially in the social sciences) there may be no clear 
notion of entropy or evolutionary development, so whatever is able to be seen as more 
developed can be seen as more complex, and in the mall example, what both inside-the-
                                                
14 If one wants to claim, with Poli (2013), p.145, that ‘all social systems are complex’, one can 
still investigate degrees of complexity. 
15 McShea (1997) conjectures that our sense of complexity in the evolution of living creatures 
may depend on intuitive and anthropocentric notions of hierarchy. 
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mall distributions have in common is that both are the outcomes of a process. However, 
this sense of process may be guided by motivations that may have little to do with 
structure. For even the absence of structure can be seen as contributing to complexity, if 
such absence is understood as a new product of a process of some sort or another, 
especially, as noted in section three, a forward-looking16 process.  
We must turn then, not to structure or dynamics, but to ontology; specifically, the 
ontology of process philosophy, for I would contend that the notion of process is able to 
resolve the tensions between structure and change that exist within most definitions of 
complexity. Complexity lies partway between order and chaos, much as process is a 
synthesis of old and new. According to Rescher, a process both reproduces itself, and 
produces novelty17.  Complexity, as we have seen, always appears to exist as a kind of 
mediation between order producing sameness and the randomness of novelty. If we 
remember that processes always involve development over stages, we can see how 
simple repetition produces order, and novelty produces disorder, and can make the 
analogy between the mix of order and randomness in complexity, and the mix of novelty 
and identity preservation in processes rather explicit.   
Let us start with a simple linear order. Of course, a linear order such as we see in 
the natural numbers in their conventional ordering <1,2,3 …> is not a simple 
reproduction of the first element, as in <1,1,1 …>; however, it may be generated by the 
repeated application of the same rule: add 1.  So in this sense such a simple arithmetical 
                                                
16 The question of what exactly distinguishes forward-looking processes from other kinds is as 
intractable as the problem of complexity itself. Rescher (1996) claims that it is a tendency 
towards complexity, but such an explanation obviously will not do here. As we have seen, 
entropy may play a role, but only where it is definable. Complexity can be found in dissipative 
systems, and in states with high levels of entropy (crystals). I believe this apparent inter-
definability of complexity and process is telling. 
17 For reproduction or sameness, Rescher (1996), pp. 85, 86; novelty, ibid, pp. 77, 78, 80. 
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order yields only sameness, as each element is in the same arithmetical ‘ratio’ to the next. 
It is not complex (and neither, a fortiori, is <1,1,1 …>).   
On the other hand, we can regard a ‘rule’ that (somehow) generates a random 
number as a rule that generates a completely ‘new’ number each time. The more 
complicated18 the set of generating rules is, the greater the difference is in each generated 
element and so the newer it is. Yet so long as this process is rule governed (with the 
caveat that the random number generating ‘rule’ above is not really a rule as such), there 
must be an element of sameness between successively generated elements, according to 
this analogy.  Thus, an order such as can be seen in the prime numbers ordered according 
to magnitude <2,3,5,7,11,13,17 …> is more complex in this sense than <1,2,3, …>, 
despite still being a linear order (and so even a linear order can be complex!). 
Of course, novelty and identity in process go beyond series of numbers, but this 
example allows us to see how one can construct a comparison between these aspects of 
process and the intermingling of the random and the ordered in complexity.  
 
5. Complexity, Robustness, and Process 
 
In order to test the hypothesis formulated here (that generalized complexity is best 
understood as process, which unites the structural and dynamic features of complexity), I 
                                                
18 By ‘complicated’ something like Kolmogorov or computational complexity can be understood. 
Here then is a connection between this sense of complexity and the more general one under 
consideration here; an important difference, however, is that while a completely random series of 
elements is maximally computationally complex, it is not complex in the sense discussed in this 
paper. The above analogy furnishes us with a reason: complexity, if always the result of a 
process, must always be rule governed to an extent, as a process always has a particular shape or 
form (for this, see Rescher (2000), p. 24 et seq.). Pure randomness is formless, and hence never 
rule governed. So by virtue of being a process, ordinary (non-computational) complexity cannot 
be random. 
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would like to examine one of the key characteristics that Ladyman, Lambert and Wiesner 
(LLW) in their ‘What is a Complex System?’ (henceforth ‘WCS’) attribute to 
complexity, namely ‘robustness’ or ‘robust order’, which they claim is a necessary (but 
not sufficient)19 condition for complexity.  We will see that robust order is not only a 
necessary characteristic of process, but is sufficient for process as well. 
According to LLW, order is robust when it is stable; that is, robust order is able to 
persist in the presence of perturbations. This is due to the property of being ‘distributed 
throughout the system’, as opposed to being located in some sort of particularly locatable 
central control. For example, a flock of seagulls is able to stay together despite 
fluctuations in wind patterns or the loss of particular members of the flock. Another 
example given in WCS is that of a living cell. A cell can repair itself when broken. A 
crystal, however, cannot20. In computational terms, a robust order possesses the capacity 
for a certain degree of ‘error correction’ or the ability to self-mend21.  
 The first thing to note is that robustness is clearly a non-structural requirement. 
Robustness cannot be described in structural terms; robustness has to do with 
preservation of structure, not with the constitution or the composition of the structure 
itself. So a crystal is clearly non-robust in this sense, as it posses plenty of structure, but 
is liable to chipping or fragmentation and so loss of structure, and it is not obvious that 
                                                
19 Robustness is one of several characteristics that LLW claim are necessary, but neither 
individually nor jointly sufficient for complexity. 
20 The implication here of course is that a crystal is not complex. LLW seem undecided about this 
issue. Crystals are cited along with ant colonies as examples of emergent systems, although they 
admit that emergence is only a necessary condition for complexity. What may be missing is the 
presence of ‘higher-level order’ in the object. As an example of a non-complex object with 
emergent properties LLW give an ideal gas. But surely crystals (and ant colonies) posses much 
more order than ideal gases! In other places LLW cite crystals as examples of systems with too 
much order to be truly complex. 
21 LLW, 39–40. 
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adding structure would somehow make it less brittle, nor that it is the presence of more 
complicated kinds of structure that make robust systems such as schools of fish or flocks 
of birds more robust. So, robustness seems to be a genuine addition to structure. 
 But what exactly is the nature of this additional quality or capacity? It must be 
noted that some kind of robustness or quality equivalent to robustness is a necessary 
component of any identifiable object at all, not simply complex objects. If robustness is a 
kind of ability to persist through change—and it appears to be—then it may be simply a 
kind of identity condition. Any object whatsoever that has an identity must have some 
sort of ability to persist through change, otherwise there would be no basis for its identity. 
Even a crystal, despite being subject to structure destroying flaws, has a kind of 
robustness in it. Many crystals can emerge from submergence in water intact (although 
some cannot); others can tolerate some degree of heating or cooling without loosing their 
structure, and all crystals can endure through at least some sort of extended passage of 
time (in fact most crystals are of course very long lived objects, persisting longer than the 
average school of fish or flock of birds!). Today’s crystal is still tomorrow’s crystal, and 
so on. In fact it would appear that, given this interpretation of robustness, crystals are in 
certain ways much more robust than many living objects, as they can withstand much 
greater extremes of temperature and pressure than any living object can. A heated crystal 
will, once the source of heat has been removed, return to the ambient temperature of its 
surroundings, and so ‘self-correct’ in a sense. 
 Is robustness then simply another word for an identity condition shared by 
complex and non-complex entities alike? Is robustness a trivial quality? Perhaps not, for 
an objection could run as follows: robustness is not just persistence though change, but a 
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certain kind of persistence, the ability to correct or to reconstitute structure, not simply to 
preserve structure, as crystals and other non-complex objects do. A heated or immersed 
crystal may undergo and later recover from change, but it loses none of its structure in the 
process. Even the classic paradox that involves persistence through change, the boat that 
has all of its planks removed one by one, while still remaining the ‘same’ boat, looses 
material, but none (or little) of the arrangement or structure of its planks22. A truly robust 
boat would be able to put itself back together, so-to-speak, even after it had been 
shipwrecked or otherwise significantly damaged, not simply persist through accidental 
changes such as temporal change in a crystal or a material change of planks.  
 It is true that a broken crystal (or boat) cannot mend itself, while a cell can, and 
likewise a hurricane can regain strength after temporarily passing over land. So 
robustness would seem to be more than simply an identity condition. However, it must be 
noted that the identity conditions for substances and for processes are rather different, and 
if we take a look at these conditions we will find that some light is thrown on the 
situation.  
 Very roughly, a substance is individuated by its properties, while it undergoes 
change by modification of accidents. Under a classical Aristotelian realist understanding 
of substance (which may or may not be identical with that held by the historical Aristotle, 
but we will leave that problem aside), a substance’s identity is guaranteed by its form, 
which is thought of as a kind of actualization of the substance’s being. This being is 
usually defined or articulated as the possession of certain kinds of properties or fully 
actualized capacities. For example, an eye has the property of sightedness, and sulfur is 
                                                
22 There are various ways of interpreting the so-called ‘Ship of Theseus’ paradox, and formal 
identity is not the only nor necessarily the best one, but it will suffice for the example. 
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odorless. Substances can undergo temporary kinds of change without losing their 
(necessary) properties, so an eye can be temporarily shut, without however becoming 
sightless, and sulfur can posses odor in the presence of impurities, but it itself is still 
(somehow) odorless (there are plenty of complications in this picture, but they can be left 
aside for the sake of the discussion.) The central feature for the purposes of this 
discussion is that properties are always somehow always to be thought of as present or 
actualized, in whatever manner that might occur in each case (which can vary greatly 
indeed—somehow we have to think of a shut eye, for example, as still sighted and not 
just potentially sighted, but I take it that this is possible). Hence, a substance can never 
lose any of its necessary properties without loosing its essential integrity and its being as 
this or that kind of substance; a sightless eye is no longer an eye. Molten sulfur is red, not 
yellow, but it is still sulfur, so from the point of view of substance we would probably 
have to conclude that sulfur is in fact ‘really’ colourless. 
 It is quite a different situation with regard to processes, however. In contrast with 
substance, a process is always coming-to-be; it is never fully actualized23. A process 
always possesses a certain measure of ‘reserve’ capacity24. We can think of a process as 
trading loss of stability or definiteness for looser identity requirements. So a hurricane, if 
thought of as a process (which does seem to be a natural way to think of a hurricane), 
need not always maintain a certain shape or form; it can loose its form, for it may still 
have a certain amount of capacity to regain this form at some later time, were it to loose it 
                                                
23 According to Whitehead, “nature is never complete”, “it is always passing beyond itself” 
(quoted from Weber (2004b)). 
24 To say that something posses a ‘reserve capacity’ seems awfully un-process like. Whitehead 
himself was uneasy with the language of hylomorphism (Weber (2004)). Perhaps a property 
location language formulation would be more appropriate—instead of an object possessing a 
reserve capacity we could instead call it a ‘locus of repetition of forms’. But in lieu of a complete 
exposition of process philosophy, I shall stick with conventional language. 
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due to some disturbance. An even better way to put it is to state that its form is somehow 
inseparable from its (the form’s) generation. So a hurricane doesn’t so much as have a 
spiral shape, as it is in the state of having or consisting of a generation or production of a 
spiral shape. This is not, however, really the same as possessing a capacity for being 
spiral-shaped, for that too can be thought of as a kind of static property, like sightedness 
of an eye.  Likewise a flock of birds can be dispersed (temporarily), while still remaining 
a flock, for the potential for turning into a flock may still somehow be present in some 
manner or other in some other stage of the process of the flock’s existence. A process 
never stands still; it is always in transition from potentiality to actuality, and so may very 
well, indeed must, secure its identity through something other than static properties. 
We can conclude that the structures of complex systems are neither accidents nor 
properties of that system. The particular structure of a complex system is integral to its 
identity and to its nature, but at the same time (and somewhat understandably given that 
most structure is a ‘surface’, and very often visual phenomenon) it is able to be disrupted 
or destroyed. Yet such disruption very often, if kept within certain parameters, does not 
lead to the destruction of the system itself. So we have a bit of a paradox25, 
philosophically speaking, in that we have an entity with a surface, accident-like property 
(the particular complex structure that characterizes the system), that may come and go 
without disturbing the essential nature of the system, but which is central to the system’s 
identity. Nor is this structure dispositional like the sightedness of an eye, which may 
remain in place despite temporary lapses of activity. Complex structure can be emergent, 
                                                
25 This ‘paradox’ extends to other aspects of processes: J. Seibt (2004) has argued that processes 
can fulfill the logical functions of both tokens and types at once, though are best thought of as 
neither.   
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but it does not seem helpful to think of it as latent26. So my suggestion is that complex 
systems are best understood as processes, which will explain the structural robustness of 
complexity.  This conclusion can be further strengthened once we realize that robust 
order may not only be a necessary but in fact a sufficient condition for process; it is 
sufficient, so long as the order involved is an essential, necessary characteristic of the 
entity involved. Thus, for example, a printed pattern (in ink) on the surface of an elastic 
object such as a rubber ball might be considered robust, as it can recover from 
deformation that occurs whenever the ball is compressed (within certain physical limits) 
or deformed, but such a pattern is not really a necessary property of said rubber ball or of 
its elastic properties. It is merely an accidental form impressed on the surface of the ball. 
It is not, therefore, ‘distributed throughout the system’ in the way the structure of a flock 
of birds is so distributed. In other words, it is not only restricted to the physical surface of 
the ball, it is, more essentially, not fully integrated into the ball’s physical or dispositional 
composition, in the way that, to chose a slightly clearer example than the ornithological 
flock, the velocities and positions of groups of air molecules in a confined gas are related 
to the energy levels or temperature of the gas. Such a pattern is, therefore, not really the 
outcome of a process; for similar reasons, it is not genuinely complex. Since it would 
appear that a substance oriented approach has central difficulties in dealing with such 
necessary, but temporarily variable, non-latent properties such as we have seen often 
characterize fully complex structures, a process-oriented approach could prove to be an 
ideal solution (provided of course that one accepts the validity of a process oriented 
                                                
26  It seems to me to be no accident that emergence is so often associated with complexity, as if in 
recognition that the more traditional terminology of latency or actuality and potentiality fails to 
capture something essential in complexity. 
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approach in the first place, as well as the concept of a necessary but potentially transient 
non-latent property.) 
An analogy might help. One can think of a complex system as a kind of musical 
performance27. Clearly more similar to a process than a static substance-like entity, it is 
also possesses a structure, a musical motif28, which is robust. Interrupted, it continues 
along in the same manner. It is always in the process of creating and bringing forth 
harmonies and melodies. If a particular sequence of chords is interrupted, it can ‘repair’ 
itself and reproduce those ‘same’ chords further along in the performance. Even out of a 
moment of silence, during a lull in the melody, the structure of the melody can emerge 
once again once the orchestra resumes playing. Yet it appears one cannot say that the 
melody was somehow latent in the period of silence, in the way that sightedness still 
remains in the momentarily shut eye. It is possible to identify the ‘essence’ of the 
performance with some central feature of the motif, say a recurrent chord or harmonic 
structure, yet this essence is neither constantly present nor somehow dispositionally latent 
in the remaining parts of the score. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks — Complexity, Process, and Anti-reductionism. 
 
Thus, what is the result of our search for a general definition of complexity? What 
connects the complexity of the order found in the vial and the pebble examples, in the  
                                                
27 By performance I mean here the phenomenological experience of the process, or perhaps even 
the musical motif considered as a purely temporally extended entity, abstracted away from the 
memories or capacities of the performers and their instruments. It helps the example to think of the 
motif as unwritten and containing much improvisation. 
28 To be more accurate, the principle harmonies or melodies of the musical motif in their temporal 
manifestation or performance. 
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examples of population distribution inside a mall, in the robust structure of the flock of 
birds and in the musical performance, and furthermore, what excludes randomness from 
being complex? It is not, I would claim, morphological structure, nor a notion such as 
equilibrium, but a metaphysical or philosophical judgment; that is, the assumption that all 
of these examples exemplify processes29. It is therefore a mistake to think that there 
exists a general notion of complexity that can be revealed, or can be defined, by structure 
or dynamics alone. Rather, such a notion can only be grounded in ontology, the ontology 
of process. Complexity (in a general or univocal sense, applicable to all the examples in 
this essay) is thus not an empirical or scientific notion, but a philosophical 
presupposition, indeed a gestalt, just as McShea claims is the case for our sense of 
increasing complexity in evolution. Given this, it is doubtful that there can be any ‘laws’ 
of complexity, any more than there can be laws of process, beyond the general 
philosophical characterizations of process that can be found in Rescher and elsewhere. 
There may very well be domain specific universals, such as the Feigenbaum constants of 
chaos theory, the KAM laws of dynamical systems theory, and various quantifiable 
results from thermodynamics, but not for complexity simpliciter.  
 Finally, a few general remarks. A number of writers (Gare, 2000), Gilbert & 
Sarkar, 2000) who have attempted to analyze complexity from a broader philosophical 
perspective, have aligned complexity theory with anti-reductionist methodologies, even 
to the extent of suggesting or even claiming that complexity theory is essentially nothing 
                                                
29 There are a number of authors who do recognize that complexity science makes normative and 
philosophical claims, in addition to empirical and scientific claims. See Woermann (2011), 
Cilliers (1998), and Gare (2000). However, the tension and ambiguity therein, the question of the 
extent to which a normative and philosophical approach can or cannot claim to yield quantifiable 
results in the natural sciences, seems to lie entirely unnoticed by these authors.  
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but the outcome of an anti-reductionist perspective. Steven Phelan, in Phelan (2001) 
however, sharply disagrees with this assessment. What of the present study? 
I first note that process philosophy itself admits of various interpretations that 
may hinge on a choice of either reductionist or anti-reductionist perspectives. For 
example, (Seibt, 2004, p. 116) claims that Rescher, along with other advocates of various 
‘classical process-ontological positions’ retains the identification of individuals with 
particular entities, a point of view which she claims is a hangover from substance-
oriented philosophies. Seibt, in other words, contends that Rescher’s version of process 
philosophy is reductionist. Reductionism, she believes, is essential to substance-oriented 
philosophy (part of its ‘core intuition’), and as a consequence must be alien to process 
philosophy. Rescher, in turn, (Weber, 2004a, p. 297) finds the issue of reductionism to be 
external to (i.e. distinct from) both process and substance philosophies, and so finds no 
difficulty with the particularism that Seibt claims that he adopts.  
The question then becomes:  Is the reductionist question key to defining 
complexity (as well as process), or is it an issue external to complexity (or external to the 
broader philosophical domain to which complexity belongs), as it is in so many other 
philosophical areas. 
I would claim that one of the reasons for the comparative fruitfulness of 
complexity and chaos theory, compared to predecessors such as von Bertalanffy's 
General System Theory (GST), may be precisely its reductionism. Whereas GST dealt, 
necessarily, with open systems, systems that interacted with outside environments, 
complexity theory is able to consider comparative systems in isolation, focusing instead 
on internal, rather than external interaction. LLW, for instance, clearly identify internal, 
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rather than external interaction, as one of their key criteria of complexity: ‘The second 
condition [of a complex system] is for the elements of the system to have the means of 
interacting’. (p.58, my emphasis).  The ensuing explanation makes clear that it is internal 
interaction among elements of the system itself that is meant. 
While GST focused on what Bertalanffy called the ‘equifinality’ of open systems, 
‘the tendency towards a characteristic final state from different initial states’ (Bertalanffy, 
1968, p. 46) complexity science is, by contrast, primarily concerned with the 
identification of patterns and regularities, in other words, (as is readily apparent in most 
definitions of complexity), with structure. As Phelan (2001, p.132) notes, in 
distinguishing GST from complexity theory, ‘Regularities do not exist in open systems, 
almost by definition.’, and so ‘Complexity writers who propound a holistic thesis are thus 
probably not complexity scientists’. Hence, in contrast to GST, where all genuine 
systems are open, complex systems can be considered in isolation from their environment 
(just as processes can be), though in fact they may very well be open to external 
influences. In GST, every system is, by definition, open to external influences.  However, 
the properties studied by complexity science, such as structure, or entropy, can be, (and in 
the case of entropy indeed must be), considered in isolation from the external 
environment. So, although a flock of birds is surely connected with its environment, 
when considering key indicators of complexity such as robustness, internal feedback, 
internal interconnection and structure, the environment can safely be placed outside the 
analytical horizon. An open system may very well be studied by a complexity theorist, 
but through internal mechanisms such as internal feedback or self-regulation, that do the 
work that outward directed mechanisms do in GST.  
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Thus, complexity theory may be said to be non-classical or non-traditional, in the 
same way that process theory is non-classical (compared to the substance-orientation of 
much of traditional philosophy and philosophy of science), yet at the same time, 
reductionist.  Von Bertalanffy was able to articulate a materialist non-classical theory by 
dispensing with such non-material suppositions such as vitalism or energeticism that have 
proven to be incompatible with modern science (see 'The Organismic Conception' in 
Bertalanffy (1975), and Gilbert & Sarkar) by accounting for the developmental properties 
of these suppositions in a new form ('organicism') acceptable to modern science. 
Similarly, complexity theory has in turn been able to adapt to modern developments in 
quantifiable sciences such as physics and the mathematized social sciences by jettisoning 
the largely holistic preoccupations of GST.  
If we must reject the line of interpretation that finds complexity an outcome of a 
largely anti-reductionist methodology, and at the same time conclude that complexity 
cannot be defined in empirical terms, where does that leave us? I find that it is process, 
rather than holism or anti-reductionism, that best provides a philosophical perspective on 
complexity. As what exactly one is to make of this perspective itself, I have attempted to 
sketch, in Taborsky (2010), an analysis of both complexity and process as articulations of 
a particular kind of ontology, an ontology of multiple or unbounded causation, as 
opposed to the bounded or one-to one causal model of classical or traditional physics. 
Such speculations are beyond the scope of this paper, but I note that causal, rather than 
entity holism, may prove fruitful in both finding common ground between process 
philosophy, complexity science and GST, (as claimed by many researchers such as Gare, 
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Abraham, and Castellani), while allowing for fundamental differences between the latter 
two, as noted by Phelan. 
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